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Abstract 
 
The history of European integration has been characterized by several ‘stops-and-goes’ 
with considerable support on political grounds. In this paper, we discuss the role of 
European integration for the future of the EU-UK relations. Integration, consistent 
with the idea of ‘completing’ the European Monetary Union (hence, a ‘Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’- GEMU), will have the obvious consequence of 
affecting the UK as well and the future of its negotiations with the EU. Provided that 
European integration worked in the past, the net benefits of staying out of the EU ex-
ante may be different from the same benefits ex-post, particularly in the likely scenario 
that the Union will have to ‘comprehensively’ move towards a GEMU to safeguard its 
integrity. 
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What is the EU-UK relation all about? 
Tracking the path from monetary integration 
to “ever closeness” 
 
People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize 
necessity when a crisis is upon them 
Jean Monnet 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea of “ever closer” union is ill-defined, owing to the uncertainty that 
surrounds it. Still, paraphrasing Jean Monnet, Europe always established itself 
through discrete and evolutionary steps, where the need for more integration, 
particularly during crises, has met with the majority of political (rather than 
economic) support. European integration has never been a jump forward all at 
once: on the contrary, the very limits one stage exposed led – in many instances 
– to the necessity for the next step. In this context, the British attitude towards 
Europe is no exception. While the UK’s support has always been volatile and 
influenced by the particular interests of the country in safeguarding trade and 
sovereignty (see also Ramiro Troitiño, 2016), the UK–EU relationship has 
historically been strong and incremental. This suggests that the multi-layer 
crisis we are living, and, as a consequence the tightening of the UK–EU 
relations, is not too telling about the E(M)U and the EU–UK relations’ future 
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 2 
success. The size of the recent crisis may well act as a catalyst for reforms; 
something not new in the European integration process.  
Since the sign up of the Maastricht Treaty, there have not been many ‘stops’ in 
European integration, the most severe one being the global economic and 
financial turmoil taking central stage in Europe. The crisis exposed the inherent 
“fragility” of the EMU (De Grauwe, 2016a), calling for the need to put in place 
a framework to deal with the growing imbalances of macro-financial and 
democratic nature within the monetary union. Since 2010, the exceptional effort 
that has been put in place has translated into reforms both on the legal and the 
institutional sides (see ECB, 2011b). Particularly, the creation a new two-pillar 
system of financial supervision (see de Larosière Group, 2009), i.e. the 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS); the conception of a 
European liquidity fund, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism; the revamp of 
macroeconomic policy coordination and fiscal surveillance, i.e. the Fiscal 
Compact and annex legislations (Two Pack and Six Pack; see ECB, 2010); 
together with a renovated role for the ECB in financial stability and supervision 
(see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015), including the historic agreement on a 
banking union for Europe (see  Macchiarelli, 2016). These initiatives, which 
were further developed in the Five President’s report, paved the way for a 
renovated European integration process, which, if successful, will have no 
precedent in the history of European integration since the introduction of the 
euro.  
Such reforms, consistent with the idea of ‘completing’ the EMU (hence, a 
‘Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’; see Juncker et al., 2015) would not 
only affect the EMU Member States’ governance, but they would also help close 
the ‘credibility’ breaches left by a ‘Europe in search for its own identity’.  
Advancing in the European integration process will have an impact on the EU 
and the single market, with the obvious consequence of affecting the UK as 
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well, and the future of its negotiations (see also Sapir and Wolff, 2016). This 
may well leave the UK in a difficult position, should negotiations fail to deliver 
a mutually beneficial deal. Provided that European integration worked in the 
past, the net benefits of staying out of the EU ex-ante may be different from the 
same benefits ex-post, particularly in the likely scenario that the Union will have 
to ‘comprehensively’ move forward to safeguard its integrity. 
 
2. European economic integration  
2.1. Lessons from the interwar period 
It is useful to start the analysis by looking at the European sovereign debt crisis 
through the lenses of the pre-Bretton Woods’ period. During the gold standard, 
the US became a big sink for gold reserves for the rest of the World. Such a 
strict convertibility of US dollars into gold makes an interesting parallel with 
the modern EMU, as both systems involve acceptance of monetary and fiscal 
orthodoxy (Bordo and James, 2013). In the gold standard, the monetary 
constraint was the convertibility of claims into gold. In the modern EMU, 
orthodoxy is imposed by the ECB’s strict inflation target. By the same token, 
fiscal orthodoxy implies both regimes to depend on the avoidance of fiscal 
deficits which would otherwise jeopardize the price stability objective. During 
the gold standard, most countries had little room to raise money through 
taxation, causing a concrete constraint on spending (Bordo and James, 2013). In 
the EMU, the constraint is explicit, with a set-up centered on the idea of “tying 
one’s hands” (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), i.e. guarding against government 
failure by agreeing on strict fiscal rules (e.g., the 1997 Stability and Growth 
Pact) letting, at the same time, markets find their equilibria (Fuest and Peichl, 
2012; see also De Grauwe, 2016a).  
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During this period many countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy and 
Portugal, experienced “sudden stops” of capital inflows (Bordo, 2006), 
whenever capital markets proved not to be deep enough to borrow in their own 
currency (i.e. an “original sin”; Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999; Bordo and 
Meissner, 2007). This situation is reminiscent of the condition of many euro area 
countries during the sovereign debt crisis since 2010, with the Member States 
being confronted with market drying out, as the result of a flight-to-quality of 
capital – facilitated by the single currency (see De Grauwe, 2016a) – towards 
their ‘safer’ EMU peers.   
By the end of 1913, the classical gold standard was at its high but WWI caused 
many countries to suspend or abandon convertibility, because of this 
asymmetric adjustment problem (Bordo and Meissner, 2007). The limits of the 
gold standard can be summarized as a series of impossible trinities (or political 
trilemmas, Rodrik, 2007; Bordo and Meissner, 2007), the most interesting one 
being the political economy trilemma. This principle states that fixed exchange 
rates, free capital flows, and democratization cannot be observed 
simultaneously. Here, the lack of democratization is understood as the removal 
of macroeconomic policy tools from the hands of “democratically accountable 
governments” (Scharpf, 2011). 1  This has become (regrettably) relevant for 
deficit countries within a monetary system. Surplus countries, such as France 
and the US, at that time, could count on the active monetary policy pursued by 
their central banks in sterilizing the gold inflows through bonds’ sales. This 
was instrumental in preventing increases of the money stock. Deficit countries, 
including the UK, on the contrary, faced pressure to deflate, when capital 
market dried out, in order to generate a medium-term surplus (Eichengreen 
                                                 
 1 This is not too dissimilar to the international relations’ trilemma: fixed exchange rates, capital flows, national policy independence.  
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and Temin, 2010). Given the impossibility to counteract imbalances with the 
remaining policies, countries were thus forced to ‘bring down’ their economies; 
something similar to what Scharpf (2011) calls “bankruptcy-cum-devaluation” 
in today’s terms.  
With time, attempts to keep gold parities that were too stringently imposed 
made several economies to suffer, including the US itself, which collapsed in 
1929. The Bretton Woods system (1944) that followed recognized the need to 
fix the exchange rate, however, under non-total parities. All parities were 
expressed with respect to the US dollar, with a ±1% margin. The dollar was 
itself convertible into gold at $35/ounce . Although there were a few 
realignments, the system worked until the 70s, being to a large degree the basis 
of the post-WWII recovery. The Bretton Woods agreement led to the creation 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose role was to provide short-
term balance-of-payment assistance – using deposits from all members – to 
countries in deficit. The creation of a liquidity fund after WWII was not 
accidental as it reflected the inherent asymmetry of the exchange rate parity 
system: with countries running a surplus having little problem in maintaining 
the exchange rate at the agreed parity, and countries in deficit eventually 
running out of reserves, with the obvious route to devaluation.  
 
2.2. From the Treaty of Rome to the Vote for Brexit 
During the 40s, despite British attitude towards integration remained positive 
– it is of 1946 W. Churchill’s famous speech on the “United States of Europe” – 
it underlined its scepticism with the major priority of the country in retaining 
sovereignty. The UK withdrew from the latest stages of negotiations of the first 
European Community, the European Coal and Steal Community (1951) – 
created to seal a long-term deal between France and Germany – and from the 
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newly-created European Economic Community (EEC), formed with the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957.  
Out of the EEC, the UK decided to join Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden and Switzerland and create the European Free Trade Agreement 
(Treaty of Stockholm, 1959). The creation of the EEC, on the one side, and the 
EFTA, on the other side, gashed Europe in two. With the EFTA, the UK was 
mainly interested in a different model for integration, based on trade and 
common agreements. The start of the so-called UK ‘relative economic decline’ 
(Figure 1), compared to France and Germany, in particular, saw the UK to later 
apply to the EEC in 1961, leaving Ireland, Norway and Denmark no alternative 
than applying as well (Ramiro Troitiño, 2016). The UK’s application was 
rejected in two instances, in 1963 and later in 1967, by the French President C. 
De Gaulle on the ground of different views on the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The UK would be able to join the EEC only in 1973 with the change of 
French presidency. The UK’s political demand of joining was by itself driven 
by two main internal reasons. First of all, there was the necessity to self-
legitimate the surrender of the UK’s economic centrality in Europe. Secondly, 
the UK government viewed the continuation of the integration path as a way 
for own future economic development and political security. 
The US decision to abandon the gold standard in 1971 (the so-called “Nixon 
Shock”), brought Bretton-Woods to an end. This stemmed by and large from 
pressure induced by the US expansionary policies in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, coupled with rising unemployment rate and an increasing current 
account deficit as a part of the financing of the Vietnam War. With a degree of 
integration of around 78% and an even higher degree of intra-investment 
dependence, Europe was too closed and focused on ‘internal affairs’ to allow 
for a system of perfectly flexible exchange rates. Moreover, the estimated 
European trade elasticities with respect to the exchange rate were too high, so 
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that excessive exchange rate fluctuations would have had significantly hurt the 
trade shares of European countries (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007). In this 
context, the Werner proposal paved the way for a model of economic and 
monetary union in Europe for the first time. The 1970s’ Plan envisaged a union 
to be achieved in three evolutionary phases, to be completed by 1980, including 
the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, labour and capital, and the 
total and irreversible convertibility of currencies. At the same time, it 
recognized the need “for the development of [a] political union which in the 
long run it [the economic and monetary union] will be unable to do without” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1970, p.26).  
Figure 1. GDP evolution in Germany, France, Italy and the UK’s relative decline (US = 100)
 
Source: Data from Valli (2002). Note: Data are in PPP for all countries but Germany. German data refer to the Federal Republic between 1950 and 1989. 
Despite the extraordinary federal reach of the proposal, any possibilities to 
develop the Plan further were abandoned under the exceptional volatility of 
exchange rates of those years. The dollar became effectively floated and the best 
countries could do was a joint float against the US, with the limited fluctuation 
of each EC currency with respect to each other. This formed the base for the 
The EU-UK relation 
 
 8 
Smithsonian Agreement, created in December 1971, by the 10 largest EC 
members. By that time, the Community had been enlarged by the entry of 
Denmark, Ireland, and the UK (Mayes, 2011). This early period is known as the 
‘snake in the tunnel’, as the Smithsonian Agreement permitted not only 
exchange rate fluctuations of 2.25% of each currency with respect to the others, 
but also a ±4.5% fluctuation limit, representing the ‘tunnel’ (Mayes, 2011). 
Market volatility and the supply side shocks of the mid-70s made France, 
Ireland, Italy and the UK struggle to remain in the snake and exit quite early 
under the impact of the first oil price crisis. The system continued with 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, West Germany, and the Netherlands only, 
until 1979 (Mayes, 2011).  
The mid-70s are critical years for the UK and its relationship with Europe. In 
1975, the UK’s National front rallied against Europe, with Labour voting to 
leave the EEC after only 2 years of membership. However, a referendum 
embraced the European cause and membership to the EEC, all in the same year. 
By 1978 the need to achieve exchange rate stability within the Community, and 
the realization of the risks of asymmetric shocks coming from excessive 
exchange rate volatility itself (Mundell, 1973), resulted in the then French 
President V. Giscard d’Estaing and the German Chancellor H. Schmidt putting 
forward a plan for the creation of a European Monetary System (EMS). This 
was essentially the result of a political decision. The EMS was initially thought 
as a way to provide a response to the constraints implied by the macroeconomic 
impossible trinity. The idea was to make participant countries commit to a 
system of fixed but adjustable pegs. The key difference from the snake was that 
instead of being a dollar-based system it reflected purely intra-Community 
exchange rate “controlled” fluctuations. At the heart of the system were the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit (ECU), the 
latter being a weighted sum of the nine component currencies. Within the ERM, 
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the same 2.25% bands were kept, except for Italy, for which a ±6% band was 
agreed. The system encouraged coordinated foreign exchange interventions 
and interest rate changes when a country approached the permitted limits. 
Besides, the EMS conceived issuance of ‘private’ ECU bonds and related 
instruments, which large corporates and governments found cheaper and 
convenient to adopt (Mayes, 2011). J. Callaghan’s Britain decided to opt out of 
the EMS in 1978, until M. Thatcher would open to the possibility of it, with the 
UK’s inclusion more than ten years later, in 1989.  
Frequent realignments (11 only in between 1979-1987; see Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz, 1993) and inflation beginning to take hold turned out soon to alter 
the symmetric structure of the agreement. The idea was that any countries 
having troubles keeping within the bands should have started to intervene 
when the currency had diverged by at least 75% of the tunnel’s edge. When this 
edge was reached, all such interventions were supposed to be symmetric. In 
practice, however, the encumbrance of adjustment was primarily placed on 
depreciating currencies. With West Germany’s deflating maneuver having 
begun in the mid-1970s, the Deutschmark enjoyed higher (than the rest of the 
EC countries) credibility, soon emerging as the center of the system. Despite 
the mark’s centrality was thought as a way to warrant the system’s standing, 
the EMS gradually started to resemble a ‘Deutschmark area’, with West 
Germany leading, and setting its own interest rate for domestic purposes, and 
the other countries following (Mayes, 2011). 
The capital market liberalization of the early 90s, together with the unification 
of the East with the West, posed a major challenge. In 1992 only, there were 12 
realignments. The German reconsolidation, above all, resulted in a large fiscal 
idiosyncratic shock. High public and private capital inflows to the East (see also 
Mundell, 1994; Hunt, 2008), as well as the new Deutschemark’s attractiveness, 
created strong appreciation pressure. Initially, the EMS prevented the 
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Deutschemark from appreciating. However, the EMS was only temporarily 
able to prevent the massive capital inflows (Sinn, 1996). The contingent 
Bundesbank’s decision to raise interest rates to contain pressure on German 
price levels exacerbated the asymmetry of the shock, especially as Europe was 
entering a recession (Velis, 1995). For Germany's ERM partners not sharing this 
need, the appropriate strategy would have been to devalue, but within the 
ERM this was not straightforward. The system began to fall apart as markets 
speculated against each of the deficit countries, in turn, forcing them out of the 
system. As explained by Mundell (1994), “a Europe-wide monetary policy 
would have cushioned the impact of the German unification shock over the 
EMS part of the continent. It would have led to more inflation than the 
Bundesbank wanted, and more deflation than her partners wanted, but a more 
balanced equilibrium for the fixed exchange rate mechanism”. Speculation 
escalated with the pound sterling being first dismissed from the ERM (“Black 
Wednesday”, 16 September 1992), followed by Italy one day later. Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland although forced to devalue, continued in the ERM. 
France, Denmark, and Belgium remained facing severe market pressure. In 
1993, under continued speculation, the permitted fluctuation bands were 
broadened to ±15%, or largely enough to cope with the misalignment and 
alleviate market stress.  
The idea of fixing the exchange rates came back as part of the idea to move to 
a monetary union under the terms set by the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. 
In 1988, particularly, the Delors’ committee set up a framework of economic 
and monetary integration to be achieved in three stages, echoing the Werner 
Report, the main idea being that “a single market required a single currency”. 
The project was a very ambitious one, especially because of the turbulent phase 
(i.e. the concomitant crisis of the EMS; see Eichgreen and Wylopsz, 1994) in 
which it was presented. With the Report, an eleven-year transition period 
  Corrado Macchiarelli 
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began before the introduction of the single currency, with national coinages 
ceasing to legally exist on 1 January 2002. The starting point was participation 
into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), followed by the narrowing of 
exchange rate bands during the second stage. Stage 1 (to be completed by 1990) 
mostly concentrated on fiscal consolidation, coordination of macroeconomic 
policy and performance, completion of the single market, and, finally, greater 
financial integration and coordination of national monetary policies. During 
phase 2 (up until 1994), a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was 
created, and attention was given to harmonizing the monetary policy tools 
among the Member States. This second stage also saw the birth of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), then European Central Bank. Shifting control of 
monetary and exchange rate macroeconomic policies from national to the 
newly born European central bank was a fundamental step of stage 3. During 
this third phase (ending on 1 January 1999) exchange rates were irrevocably 
fixed. 
The criteria for the run up to stage 3 of the EMU were set in the well-known 
Maastricht criteria (Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht Council, 
December 1991). While achieving an immediate monetary integration would 
have probably been desirable in a long-run perspective (Eichgreen and 
Wylopsz, 1994), it seemed unrealizable from both a political and economic 
perspective. The Maastricht Treaty was successful in correctly signaling a 
“convergence of preferences” among member states, by setting up a clear 
timeline for integration. That is why Maastricht has to be primarily understood 
as a political process, which flourished particularly thanks to the “bargain” 
between Germany and France (Baun, 1996).  
The collapse of the EMS in 1992 was giving clear evidence that monetary 
convergence was any longer sufficient neither to guarantee the credibility of 
fixed exchange rates nor to prevent systematic imbalances to occur. This is why 
The EU-UK relation 
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the Maastricht criteria created the occasion to outwit the foregoing stability 
condition in inflation rates, requiring additional convergence in interest rates 
and exchange rates (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007), as well as fiscal policies. 
The latter particularly, reflected the idea of acquiescence to clear fiscal targets, 
i.e. fiscal orthodoxy (see Bordo and James, 2013) which – together with an explicit 
provision to discourage governments to resort to price rises for debt financing 
(i.e. ‘no monetary financing’ – Art. 123 TFEU) – was seen as a way to reduce 
the risk of high inflation (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Chari et al., 2015). In 
this respect, the Maastricht criteria – albeit controversial in today’s terms (De 
Grauwe, 2016a) – were numbers reflecting political realities at that time, and 
not just discrete targets (Klein, 1998).2 
Table 1. The orthodoxy in the Maastricht criteria 
“Monetary orthodoxy” Inflation rate not exceeding 1,5% of the mean of EC countries  with lower inflation. The interest rate on long-term Government Securities not greater than 2% with respect to the mean of the three least inflation countries. Exchange rate within the ERM fluctuations margins for at least 2 years. 
“Fiscal orthodoxy” 
Gross public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP, or converging at a “satisfactory pace”. Public deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP. 
Already in 1988, M. Thatcher announced Britain’s intention not to join the 
European economic and monetary integration plan. That was followed by 
severe political turmoil in the UK, with the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, N. Ridley, being forced to resign in July 1990 following a 
controversial interview, and the UK's deputy Prime Minister, G. Howe, 
                                                 
 2 For a critical discussion, see also De Grauwe (1994). 
  Corrado Macchiarelli 
 13 
resigning in November of the same year because of his disagreement with 
Thatcher's opposing policy towards the single European currency. Thatcher 
will resign 3 weeks later.  
With the first 11 countries signing up to the euro, on stage 3 of the EMU, Britain 
stayed out. In the negotiations leading up to Maastricht, the UK was granted 
an opt-out clause. Technically it was not eligible because of 2-year ERM 
criterion; in practice, it would have been almost certainly granted admission 
based on the standard macroeconomic convergence indicators (see also Ramiro 
Troitiño, 2016). Looking at the period averages reported in Table 1, in the 
decade elapsing in between stage 1 and 3 of the EMU, the UK performed quite 
well with respect to the Maastricht criteria. The pattern of short-term interest 
rates at 1-month maturity (Figure 2) after the euro suggests – however – a 
monetary policy stance which is specific to the country (see also Holden, 2009). 
Chiefly, with the decision to stay out, the United Kingdom retained sovereignty  
Table 2.  Macroeconomic convergence 
 
Source: OECD Data from Holden (2009). Note: inflation deviation refers to the absolute value of 
annual deviation from the ECB’s target of 2 percent.  
and the right to conduct autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy. This 
was different for the euro area, where monetary policy decisions were indeed 
delegated to the Governing Council of the ECB for all euro area countries; a 
1989‐98 1999‐07 1989‐98 1999‐07 1989‐98 1999‐07
2.3 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.0
0.1 1.0 ‐0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8
3.7 2.1 3.7 1.6 4.0 2.4
2.0 0.6 1.8 0.6 2.4 0.8
‐4.3 ‐1.8 ‐3.7  ‐1.3  ‐4.0 ‐0.8
80.2 71.8 53.4 47.5 73.3 56.8
1.0 1.6 ‐1.1  ‐2.2 1.7 2.9Trade balance
Period averages
Real GDP growth
Employment growth
Inflation  
Inflation deviation
Fiscal balance
Gross public debt
euro area UK euro area 
unweighted
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stance now identified with the much-discussed term ‘one-size-fits-all’ (see 
Peersman and Smets, 1999; Nechio, 2011).3 
During the first years after the introduction of the euro, the British pound 
appreciated against the new currency, to some extent following the strong US 
dollar (Figure 2). For the pound, sizeable fluctuations have persisted through 
the whole sample period as the pound has appreciated even more before the 
vote of June 2016, largely driven by “safe-haven” effects.  In the debate about 
monetary union membership, one concern for the UK was to maintain the 
credibility of monetary and exchange rate policy. The numbers in Table and 
Figure 1 suggest that ‘borrowing credibility’ was indeed never a concern for 
the UK, which fared relatively well in keeping inflation in check, with the 
possible exception of the immediate post-crisis period.  
In 1997, the UK committed itself to joining in principle the single currency, but 
with a number of caveats (the so-called G. Brown’s Five Tests), the main one 
being that EMU membership should have been achieved in the national 
interests. In 2003, a review by the UK Treasury concluded that the investment 
and financial services tests were met, but the convergence and flexibility tests 
were not. Thus, the Treasury’s assessment, i.e. that “a clear and unambiguous 
case for UK membership of EMU has not at the present time been made and a 
decision to join now would not be in the national economic interest”,4 reduced 
membership to a technical matter, showing once again British relation to the 
integration process as a very pragmatic one, with the country expecting an 
immediate, or anyway short-term, payback for its contribution. 5  This is 
                                                 
 3 Nowadays, as a member of the EU (still), the UK sits the General Council of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), comprising the President and Vice-President of the ECB, plus the governors of the national central banks of the 28 EU States. 4 Emphasis added. 5 Clearly, the idea of membership being in the “national interests” also relies on the national history linked to the traditional role of the pound and political reputation (see De Grauwe, 2016; Holden, 2009). 
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something dating back already to 1984 with Thatcher’s infamous “I want my 
money back” struggle to reduce Britain's EEC budget participation. It is in this  
Figure 2.  Macroeconomic and international finance indicators for the UK in comparison with the euro area and the US 
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Source: Datastream, BoE, and ECB data. Note: Data for the euro area use ECB’s vintage data prior 
to Jan. 1999 or, for Treasury bonds, Germany’s. Last observation is May 2015. 
environment that the then Prime Minister T. Blair committed to a referendum 
on Europe’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004, which happened to never occur. Ten 
years later, on Jan 2013, Prime Minister D. Cameron promised a second time to 
give the British people the "simple choice" by the end of 2017 between staying 
in the EU under the UK's renegotiated terms, or leaving. The European Union 
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Referendum Bill became law in May 2015, resulting in the June 2016 historic 
vote to leave.6 
 
3. Understanding integration  
As a first test of the empirical plausibility of the theories, I provide descriptive 
summary statistics of budget shares under different constellations of 
ministerial alignment. Since the econometric tests model the country means by 
country-specific fixed effects, the spending shares shown on Figure 2 below are 
demeaned averages, i.e. deviations from the country-specific means. 
By looking at the history of previous monetary systems in Europe, there is 
something to learn about the state of health of the monetary union today. 
Undoubtedly, the relaxation of fluctuation limits during the EMS has generally 
provided countries with the needed flexibility to adjust to shocks. However, 
this has to do more with the EMS set-up rather than fixing of the exchange rate 
itself. 
During the 70s inflation was the major spectrum to fight, especially after the 
supply side shocks of those years. In both the EMS and the EMU, the 
asymmetry of the adjustment problem forced a strategy of disinflation on 
deficit countries – appealingly exploiting the lessons from the German 
Bundesbank – which soon proved not sustainable. This strategy has historically 
exposed the system’s difficulty in managing idiosyncratic shocks, maintaining, 
at the same time, credibility. Particularly, there are two main channels through 
which credibility problems may arise both in a system of fixed exchange rates 
without a currency (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007) – like the EMS – and in the 
                                                 
 6 Technically, under the provisions set by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Art. 50).  
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system of a currency without a nation – like the EMU. In both systems, these can 
be identified as (see also Weber, 1991; Salvatore, 1997; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015): 
i. Adjustment costs; 
ii. Liquidity or coordination costs. 
In the history of monetary integration, countries losing the ability to use the 
exchange rate suffered from costly adjustments ex post mainly in terms of 
unemployment. As far as the EMS is concerned, De Grauwe (1994) shows how 
both the average unemployment rate and the inflation differential with respect 
to the reference currency had a significant impact on the credibility of the 
system. It is thus clear that the convergence of inflation rates pursued during 
the 1980s, although necessary for the well-functioning of the system, was not 
sufficient to prevent speculative crises, particularly in the lack of structural 
reforms. The liquidity problem for the EMS was, on the contrary, a typical n-1 
problem in which choosing the appropriate monetary policy prevailing 
through the system resulted in a coordination failure (De Grauwe, 1994)– i.e. 
whenever the member countries felt that the monetary stance undertaken by 
the leading currency may not have been representative of the system as a 
whole. The EMS suffered from a lack of credibility because it was set-up on a 
union in which national currencies were to be maintained with ‘irrevocably’ 
fixed exchange rates. This was just inefficient in dealing with asymmetric 
shocks (De Grauwe, 1994; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015).    
As for the EMU, the aforementioned adjustment problems can be understood 
as a moral-hazard problem. The very disappearance of the exchange rate led to 
protectionism, access to larger than domestic capital markets (the so-called 
“common pool” problem; see, inter alia, Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999; 
Wyplosz and Kostrup, 2010), and a higher capacity to borrow, overall 
weakening incentives for structural reforms (see Calmfors, 2001). Such weak 
leverage for adjustment exacerbated divergence issues in some countries, 
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resulting into higher than necessary adjustments’ costs later on (see De 
Grauwe, 2016a). That is to say that the creation of a currency union in Europe 
weakened the incentive for a market-based flexibility that could have offset (or 
at least limited) the loss of exchange rate as an adjustment tool (see also Bean, 
1998; De Grauwe, 2016a).  
The liquidity problem in today’s terms is slightly different than the one 
countries were confronted with during the EMS. This problem has to do instead 
with the “fragility” of a system centered on n Treasuries and 1 central bank. 
Hence, the problem of a currency with ‘too many countries’ (see also De 
Grauwe, 2016a; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015). In this system, not only countries will 
issue debt in a currency they have no control of (a situation reminiscent of the 
gold standard’s “original sin”, as we recalled), but also the presence of a 
“lender of last resort” for sovereigns is not granted. As explained by De 
Grauwe (2016a), differently from a stand-alone country such as the UK, the 
Treasury of any EMU member states not only will not benefit from the 
exchange rate tool in cushioning shocks – thus preventing capital flights-to-
safety towards other EMU countries – but also they will not have the 
unconditional backup of their national central bank. Simply because in the 
EMU there is no effectively functioning national central bank, with the 
exception of the ECB. The ECB could certainly intervene and act as a “lender of 
last resort”, as it did exceptionally (see Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2016). 
However, the European Bank will have the major constraints deriving from the 
complexity of the governance framework of the monetary union (Gerba and 
Macchiarelli, 2016): again 1 central bank and n Treasuries. In the jargon of game 
theory, the problem with this set-up is that the Member States’ fiscal authorities 
will be better off if the ECB intervenes, obviating the need for fiscal 
intervention. Likewise, the ECB will be better off if the governments agree to 
use their fiscal stimulus, thus alleviating the pressure on the ECB itself (see 
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Onorante, 2007; Alcidi and Giovannini, 2013). Once again, this gives rise to 
coordination failures. 
3.1. Theory behind economic integration 
From a theoretical standpoint, the “economics” of European integration can be 
understood under two broad headings. The first is the optimal control 
approach or the political economy of strict fiscal rules (see Fuest and Peichl, 2012; 
De Grauwe, 2016a), discussed earlier. This approach tends to identify in the 
moral hazard implicit in pooling the exchange rate and monetary policy 
competencies as the main problem within a currency union. A second popular 
set of tools is the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) first developed in the 1960s 
(Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963), and centered on the idea of trade openness, 
the flexibility of (labor and product) markets, and business cycle’s symmetry. 
The UK’s attitude towards the EU has historically put much emphasis on the 
former.   
The main research question driving the scholarship on OCA has to do with the 
costs and benefits of sharing a currency (Alesina and Barro 2002). The main cost 
is the loss of monetary policy and exchange rate autonomy, the latter being 
particularly relevant in the presence of asymmetric shocks. Benefits are mostly 
in terms of reduction of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty, and of 
increasing price transparency, trade, and competition. Other recent work calls 
the attention to the role of credibility shocks. If there are varying degrees of 
commitment, countries with dissimilar credibility shocks, which exacerbate 
time inconsistency, may find profitable to join a currency union (Chari et al., 
2015).  
The existence of idiosyncratic shocks alone is not sufficient to establish the case 
for retaining separate currencies. Nominal exchange rate realignments are only 
helpful in facilitating adjustment when nominal wages and/or prices are not 
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flexible. In other words, the pattern of asymmetric shocks across countries 
depends on the degree of nominal inertia.7 De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) have 
studied the interactions between symmetry, flexibility, and integration in an 
OCA framework. For both pairs ‘symmetry vs. flexibility’ and ‘symmetry vs. 
integration’ the relation is downward sloping (Figure 3). 8  Focusing on the 
degree of economic integration and symmetry and how it evolves over time, 
there are different views on such evolution (as illustrated by arrows around the 
EU and Euro circles in the Figure; see also Krugman, 1993). In Figure 3, the 
downward sloping OCA-line shows the minimum combinations of symmetry 
and openness that countries must have in order for a monetary union to 
provide positive net benefits.  
Figure 3.  The interaction between synchronization and openness 
 
Source: Campos and Macchiarelli (2016a) based on De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). 
                                                 
 7  In more general terms, however, also fiscal adjustments at the euro area level (on top of flexibility) could replace the lack of monetary policy autonomy when countries face divergent patterns (i.e. like in the US; see Mundell, 1973). 8 Another important recent strand highlights situations when OCA criteria are interdependent and focus on interactions between openness and mobility (Farhi and Werning, 2015). 
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A similar relationship exists between symmetry and flexibility. In particular, 
countries or regions located below the OCA line do not have enough flexibility 
given the level of symmetry they face. Countries to the right of the OCA line 
have a lot of flexibility given the level of symmetry they face. Ultimately, the 
empirical evidence about how many countries in the E(M)U form an OCA is 
not clear-cut. Particularly, for the UK the empirical evidence based on these 
three factors is rather mixed (see De Grauwe, 2016a; Campos, Coricelli, and 
Moretti, 2014; Campos and Macchiarelli, 2016b; Pesaran, Smith and Smith, 
2007; Holden, 2009). 
3.1.1. Openness 
While one would expect a monetary union to have a positive effect on trade, 
given a reduction in transaction costs and exchange rate risk, as well as higher 
price transparency, as discussed, the size of the estimated effect of currency 
unions on trade varies. Seminal work by Frankel and Rose (1998) suggested 
possible endogeneity of currency unions: i.e. where more openness did not 
have to be met ex-ante but rather will ex-post. However, recent econometric 
evidence reports “no substantive reliable and robust effect” of currency unions 
on trade, overall challenging this wisdom (Glick and Rose, 2016).  Yet, the 
degree of openness is, vice versa, likely to increase the benefits. The evidence 
suggests there are large differences in the openness of EU countries with the 
rest of the Union. For the UK, trade of goods between the UK and the rest of 
the EU is typically low (De Grauwe, 2016a), whereas much of the trade share is 
accounted by financial services (Source: Office for National Statistics). 
3.1.2. Flexibility 
The lack of independent monetary policy within a monetary union raises the 
call for labor market flexibility. In particular, in Mundell’s (1961) and 
McKinnon’s (1963) original framework the degree of labor market flexibility 
matters for determining whether a monetary union is attractive to countries 
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(De Grauwe, 2016a).  When it comes to flexibility, one can distinguish between 
(i) the pace at which people transition in and out of work, or across sectors, and 
(ii) wage flexibility. Looking at standard indicators for flexibility, such as 
individual protection, the use of temporary work, and collective dismissal, the 
UK typically scores low on the protection of individuals, along with other 
Anglo-Saxon economies, standing in contrast to other continental European 
countries such as in Germany, Italy, and France where protection is 
significantly higher. The same contrast is true also for temporary work, with 
very a strict regulation in Spain, France, and Italy, differently from Anglo-
Saxon economies (2013 OECD’s data from the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
and Development). As underlined by Holden (2009), despite the UK labor 
market being among the most flexible in Europe, the 1993 Treasury Assessment 
based on the 5 Tests highlighted skepticism as to whether flexibility would 
have been sufficient to cope with a monetary union (Holden, 2009). The second 
key aspect of the labor market flexibility is wage setting. The UK has started an 
important process of decentralization of wage setting since the 70s (Source: 
Golden and Wallerstein’s database, 2006) suggesting a greater degree of 
moderation (see Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Driffill, 2006), hence normally 
being better positioned in facing supply side shock within a monetary union 
(see also De Grauwe, 2016a). 
3.1.3. Symmetry 
The efforts to create a European monetary union have sparked increased 
interest in measuring the synchronization of the business cycles since the 
beginning of the 1990s. A high level of convergence among the national 
business cycles, which is the absence of sharp asymmetrical shocks between 
one country and the euro area, is an important criterion for an OCA. The extent 
of synchronization between the euro area and the UK studied here can be 
determined by the correlation of the cyclical components (HP-filtered) in their 
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industrial production (Figure 4; see also Artis, 2003). The cyclical component is 
calculated as the difference between industrial production growth and an 
estimate of the trend. Since the euro introduction, the UK’s volatility has been 
considerably lower (Table 3), with this stability being typically attributed to 
strong domestic demand, with private and public sector consumption and 
capital investment on new construction contributing to stabilization (Moser et 
al., 2004). Table 3 also shows that, since the start of EMU, the business cycle of 
the UK has been correlated considerably with that of the euro area. What is 
striking is the low level of the correlation for the United Kingdom and the euro 
area at the beginning of the series, before the EMU (Massman and Mitchell, 
2002; Campos and Macchiarelli, 2016a), something possibly attributed also to 
the UK sterling dismissal from the EMS in 1992. These fluctuations in the real 
activity-gap have become smaller over time (see Campos and Macchiarelli, 
2016a), with correlation being stronger in the second half of the sample. Several 
studies show that the convergence between the Eurozone and the UK has 
increased since the EMU (e.g. Angeloni and Dedola, 1999; Campos, Coricelli, 
and Moretti, 2014; Canova et al. 2005; European Commission, 2008; Massman 
and Mitchell, 2002). In spite of more synchronization, there are still sizeable 
differences, particularly in the extent monetary policy (captured by short-term 
interest rates) has been conducted. Assuming a lower interest rate in the UK 
during the mid-2000, mimicking the ECB’s path would have clearly stimulated 
the late 2000s bubble in property prices further, presumably making the 2008-
09 bust sharper (Holden, 2009). However, all such conjectures are purely 
speculative, as well they present an obvious endogeneity problem. By the 
design of the EMU, the ECB is constrained to a “one-size-fits-all” monetary 
policy – the latter being likely to increase the costs of joining the EMU the most 
de-synchronized are the Member States’ cycles. Nonetheless, should the UK 
have joined, the optimal monetary policy response of the ECB would have 
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possibly been different, reflecting the size and the importance of the UK 
economy as well (see also Nechio, 2011; Peersman and Smets, 1999). 
Figure 4.  The UK vs. the Eurozone and the US cycles 
 
Source: Datastream. Author’s calculations. 
Table 3.  Standard deviation and correlation of economic cycles 
 
Source: Datastream. Author’s calculations. 
3.2. The EMU convergence criteria: a second look 
Although it is unclear what the prospects for the UK will be outside of the EU, 
a continuation of the process of European integration, in theory, would be 
weighed based on the Maastricht convergence criteria. The problem with these 
criteria has always been political. The Maastricht Treaty was, in fact, paying 
Jan 1989- Dec 1998 Jan 1999 - May 2015 Jan 1999 - Jul 2007
ST.DEV.(UK) 1.119 1.609 1.166
ST.DEV.(EUR) 1.741 2.859 1.332
ST.DEV.(US) 0.918 2.105 1.306
CORR(EUR,UK) 0.300 0.865 0.627
CORR(EUR,US) 0.291 0.872 0.604
CORR(UK,US) 0.508 0.786 0.511
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attention to the idea that, in order to join the new arrangement, countries had 
to converge sufficiently in their monetary and fiscal policies. Already at the 
time of their adoption, the unstable conjecture inherited from the EMS crash 
have probably been “the driving factor in widening the perception that the 
required criteria were almost paradoxical” (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007; see 
also De Grauwe, 2016a). The political paradox was, inter alia, accentuated by 
the evidence that many countries were finding it difficult to fulfil these criteria 
using policies of fiscal stabilization which were accompanied by economic 
stagnation, thus keeping actual budget deficits high (as a % of GDP), in spite of 
any significant attempts to cut public spending (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 
2007). Once again, political support among member states remained the 
strongest in pursuing these goals, above and beyond economic reasons. That is 
what historically lacked in the UK. 
Some (e.g., Baldin & Wyplosz, 2006) have argued that the necessity of the 
stringent convergence criteria, conceptualized through the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty, was a main attempt to compensate for the fact that Europe 
was indeed not an OCA. In this respect, the main concern for any enlargements 
of the monetary union to any other country, including the UK, would be again 
represented by the costs of adjustment in order to deal with asymmetric shocks. 
In the absence of sufficient labor market flexibility and/or of fiscal transfers at 
the euro-area level, many countries would suffer from severe adjustment 
problems. As the crisis made very clear, the lack of such adjustment 
mechanisms, in the presence of asymmetries, has made adjustment costs ex post 
very high in order for the integrity of the monetary union to be preserved (see 
Scharpf, 2011; De la Dehesa, 2012).  
Already since before the start of the EMU, this conception of asymmetries has 
spurred an alternative approach to European integration: the possibility of a 
two-tier or ‘multi-speed Europe’. Not least, during the recent (at the time of 
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writing) EU6 Summit in Brussels, the limitations of a treaty commitment to 
pursue the “ever closer union” of the peoples of Europe were reaffirmed as a 
part of a package to facilitate Cameron’s campaign before the referendum. 
While acknowledging that the Union “allows for different paths of 
integration”, however, European negotiators (French and Belgium in 
particular) were against the idea of a ‘pic-n-mix’ Europe by adding a clear re-
statement of the principle that all countries – unless they have an explicit 
exemption like Denmark (or Britain, before the referendum) – must ultimately 
join the single currency. 
Figure 5.  The role of asymmetries 25 years before and after the EMU 
 
Source: Campos and Macchiarelli (2016b). Note: list of countries - BE = Belgium; DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; GR = Greece; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; NL= Netherlands; PT = Portugal; UK = United Kingdom. The correlation for demand and supply shock is presented with respect to the anchor region (DE = Germany). 
From an economic viewpoint, it is true that smaller groups of selected countries 
may be better candidates in forming an OCA, given the homogeneity that 
characterizes them (see also De Grauwe, 2016a). Looking at the early evidence 
on the degree of synchronization of shocks across countries before the EMU 
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(1963 – 88), it seems that, with respect to the supply side, one can identify a 
“core” region-Germany, France, Denmark and Benelux, where the shocks are 
highly correlated, as well as a “periphery” region where the correlation with 
the anchor region is much lower (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993). With 
respect to demand shocks, there is more of a difference: the correlation with 
Germany is much lower, even for the other countries of the European core. The 
EMU may have eliminated independent national monetary policies as a source 
of idiosyncratic demand shocks, but national fiscal policies remained 
independent so the cross-country correlation in movements in demand may 
well persist (see also ECB, 2011a). Using Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) 
criterion on the supply-side core-periphery divide, Campos and Macchiarelli 
(2016b) show that the UK has moved from the periphery (1963 – 88) to core 
(1989 – 2015) (Figure 5). The results for the UK are admittedly not strong. Said 
that, however, a new, smaller, periphery has emerged (Spain, Portugal, Ireland 
and Greece). Thus, the EMU has actually weakened the core-periphery pattern, 
resulting into countries being more integrated over time.    
To conclude, while the hypothesis of a ‘multi-tier’ Europe cannot be dismissed 
based on the little evidence available, there is a second (and opposite) 
alternative to a ‘multi-speed’ line of work: a process of reform and – possibly – 
deepening. This is the spirit of the 5 Presidents Report, which we will cover in 
the next section.  
 
4. Towards a GEMU 
The 5 President Report is a far-reaching initiative for a “deeper and fairer” 
Union, focusing on four key policy areas (Junker et al., 2015; see also Begg, 
2014): an integrated financial framework to ensure macro and micro financial 
stability and supervision at the euro area level; an integrated fiscal framework 
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with the dual goal of delivering discipline and developing new common fiscal 
policy instruments; an integrated economic policy framework to ensure 
macroeconomic policy coordination, fairness and competitiveness; and finally, 
enhancement of democratic legitimation (see also Scharpf, 2011). 
The key question the Report seeks to answer is: where did the EMU fail and 
how can it be fixed? (see Pisani-Ferri, 2012; 2013; De la Dehesa, 2012; De 
Grauwe, 2016a; Scharpf, 2011). The Report consists of “short term”, “medium 
term” and “long term” reforms; i.e. as clearly a fiscal or a political union will 
take longer, given the transfer of sovereignty they involve, than (the existing) 
bank supervision (see Macchiarelli, 2016 ), or coordination of macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies, which are short to medium term measures. The timeline of 
the 5 President Report, particularly, reads as follows: 
A first phase (between now and early 2017) of “deepening by doing”, building 
on the existing EMU framework and instruments, including legal provisions, 
with a view to boost competitiveness and structural convergence, achieving 
budgetary discipline at national and the euro area level, completing financial 
integration (i.e. a capital market Union, federal Resolution, and European 
deposit insurance are on the way), and increasing democratic accountability. A 
second phase of “completing EMU”, including medium to long-term reforms, 
also of legal nature, with a set of commonly agreed benchmarks for 
convergence.  A third phase (to be completed by 2025) of furthering integration 
– this phase will not exclude other EU countries from joining. 
4.1. Is “completing” the EMU compatible with dropping the “ever 
closer union” clause? 
The key question, in the light of the state of the EU–UK negotiations before June 
2016, is whether “completion” of the Union would be compatible with the 
dropping of the clause of “ever closeness”. Let me start by saying that the 
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answer to the above question should be negative. This does not mean 
intermediate solutions cannot be found in seeking an agreement with the UK. 
Particularly, there are at least two arguments for the answer above, both falling 
under the remit of political economy.  
The first motivation is political.  
Many parties have voiced concerns that a British-exit could be the beginning of 
the end for Europe, or – not least – lead to a stall in integration. In their view, 
the UK could be followed by other countries, creating a legal precedent in the 
European integration path, within the remit of Lisbon’s Art. 50. Let us not 
forget, however, that the UK’s vote to leave was the peak of an iceberg, 
preceded by a period during which Europe has been gripped in waves of Euro-
scepticism (see also Mongelli, 2013). This trend is strictly linked to the notion 
of Weber’s credibility (Weber, 1991); the latter always having been considered 
a key issue in Europe’s identity. Low credibility has been cyclical in the history 
of European integration, in some sense accompanying the recessive phases of 
the economic cycles (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007) whenever those 
translated into crises challenging the prevailing paradigm or exposing the 
system’s inherent fragilities. This continuous search for credibility has worked 
as an accelerator to the process of integration, leaving in most cases European 
countries no chances but joining in (Macchiarelli and Sangalli, 2007). The 
underlying logic to the convergence criteria has to be evaluated in the light of 
the will of conditioning expectations concerning the future path of the 
European economic and monetary union (i.e. a “convergence of preferences”). 
The question of a currency without a nation, together with that of ‘betrayed 
expectations’ in terms of post-euro introduction growth, is nowadays the most 
compelling elements holding the EMU’s credibility down (Macchiarelli and 
Sangalli, 2007). Particularly, the realization that the positive cycle after the 
period of very slow growth characterizing the mid-2000s was by and large 
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‘bubbly’, and coming at the exposes of a growing north-south divide (see De la 
Dehesa, 2012), raised many questions concerning the long-term viability of the 
European project. 
Agreeing to the idea of transition to a GEMU, albeit sounding unprecedented, 
could indeed ensure that needed convergence in a political sense, in a period 
in which the credibility of the Union is at stake and its democratic base drifting 
away. The UK never really bought into the European project with a view of 
being a part of an “ever closer” union, but rather to balance power within 
Europe. This explains why British attitude has frequently been based on 
dismissing or openly rejecting further steps of integration. 
There is little clarity about what new relationship the UK and the EU will seek 
within each other. However, concerns about preserving and defending 
European integration should be the point starting from which the EU will need 
to negotiate a new agreement with the UK (see Oliver 2016).9 That is to say that 
it is now crucial for Europe to provide an alternative model of integration for 
countries like Sweden, Denmark Poland, or other ‘pre-ins’, avoiding 
unleashing centrifugal forces which could unravel the Union itself. At the same 
time, further integration would prevent a ‘controlled’ disintegration path 
through a multi-speed approach. Providing this alternative model is thus not 
imaginable without committing to transitioning to a GEMU.  
The second motivation is economic.  
Let us start with the conceptualization of the EMU’s sovereign debt crisis as a 
vicious circle, the so-called ‘doom loop’. The sovereign debt crisis that started 
                                                 
 9 A British exit could hit EU–NATO relations at a time when the US government is pushing for enhanced geopolitical relations with the EU through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (see Hamilton 2014). 
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in 2010 exposed the very “fragility” of the EMU architecture (De Grauwe, 
2016a), highlighting the danger of an unfinished set-up at the core of the 
“wrecking spiral” (Macchiarelli, 2016) between public and private debt. 
Following on from our previous discussion, the ‘doom loop’ took place when 
one or more conditions were met: 
Liquidity costs 
a) Lack of fiscal discipline 
b) Excess of private debt 
Adjustment costs 
c) Lack of structural reforms 
The accumulation of imbalances that characterized the pre-2010 – facilitated by 
the ECB’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy, and loose financial market regulation (see 
Pisani-Ferri, 2012; 2013; De la Dehesa, 2012; De Grauwe, 2016a) – resulted into 
countries being unable to stall the crisis, needing a coordinated support at the 
European level. For banks, for instance, last-resort guarantees from 
governments to their own financial institutions (see also Gros and 
Schoenmaker, 2014) resulted in higher public debt and generally large costs to 
taxpayers (see Macchiarelli, 2016). In several cases, e.g. Spain or Ireland, this 
resulted in a self-reinforcing amplification effect relating to the classical 
problem of (ir)rational runs in which the market can push an economy into a 
“bad” equilibrium (see also De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; De Grauwe, 2016a). This 
amplification within the EMU had to do (Macchiarelli, 2016), at first, with a 
collapse of confidence in certain markets and financial institutions at the same 
time, and the broader fragility of systems, because of increased risk or 
asymmetry of information (see also IMF, 2013). Secondly, the interaction 
between bond prices (via banks’ balance sheets) and borrowing constraints, 
where – to make things easy – the fire-sale of government bonds and rising of 
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risk premia had a negative effect on the banks’ net worth, with an ensuing 
liquidity dry-out and freezing of lending to the real economy. Figure 6 
summarizes this discussion.  
As Macchiarelli (2016) shows, should the 5 President Report not be adopted, 
there would be relatively little change compared with the position reached as 
a result of the governance changes already introduced since 2010 (see ECB, 
2011a). This could result into the GEMU not making it through to stage 2, 
resulting into the aforementioned ‘doom-loop’ not being completely broken 
(see also Begg, 2016). A ‘Comprehensive GEMU’ (Begg et al., 2104), on the 
contrary, would include an extensive and progressive adoption of the 
additional transfers of power to the European level, resulting not only in an 
extraordinary development in a federal sense, in the long term, but also in the 
loop being finally broken (Figure 6).   
As a matter of fact, the Union has very little options outside transitioning to a 
GEMU. Otherwise the EMU would be characterized by yet another “impossible 
trinity” (Pisani-Ferri, 2012) – absence of co-responsibility over public debt, 
strict ‘non-monetary financing’ rule (Art. 123 TFEU) and the combination of 
free capital movements and national responsibility for supervising and, if 
needed, rescuing banking systems – which the 5 President Report is committed 
to break. This will chiefly be through the introduction of a fiscal and a banking 
union. A political union will be then required not to violate the archetype of 
“no taxation without representation”.  
It is worth noting that these reforms, however, implemented, would not only 
affect the EMU Member States’ macroeconomic, financial, fiscal, and political 
governance, but they would have an impact on the EU and the single market, 
with the obvious consequence of affecting the UK as well, and the future of its 
negotiations (see also Sapir and Wolff, 2016). In the best case scenario, 
The EU-UK relation 
 
 34 
advancing in the European integration process may result in some of the ‘euro-
outs’ to make use of their option to opt-in going ahead. This may leave the UK 
Figure 6.  
A representation of the crisis ‘doom-loop’ 
(a)  
…and how a ‘comprehensive’ GEMU would break it 
(b)  Source: Macchiarelli (2016). Note: The Figure includes the main reforms of the European economic governance framework already in place (grey) and measures not yet in place (black box), as a part of the 5 President Report. The Figure does not consider measures which are temporary in nature such as unconventional monetary policy. 
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in a difficult position, should EU negotiations fail to deliver a solution 
appropriate for both. Provided that European integration worked in the past, 
the net benefits of staying out of the EU ex-ante may be different from the same 
benefits ex-post, particularly in the likely scenario the Union will have to 
‘comprehensively’ move forward for its own survival. 
 
5. Looking forward 
Seeking immediate benefits from membership to the European project has its 
limitations. Historically, even in continental Europe, more integration in a 
federal sense was limited to the extent that the interests of the EU itself (or, joint 
EU utility) did not necessarily match the sum of the utility of individual 
Member States (or, aggregate utility). This has had significant implications for 
the process of EU integration as a whole (Begg et al., 2014). The crisis is 
gradually changing this predicament, as the skewed design of the system (a 
strong monetary leg and a weak economic leg, or the ECB’s “institutional 
loneliness” as the former ECB’s Governing Council member, T. Padoa-
Schioppa, eloquently put it) 10  resulted in larger costs for the EU if taken 
together.11    
Most views are that the outcome of the referendum – a reflection of “British 
exceptionalism” – will cost heavily economically, mainly to Britain. The EU 
would feel some knock-on costs as well, with the EU reduced weight on the 
international political grounds (Butler et al. 2016). Brexit will certainly change 
                                                 
 10 See Padoa-Schioppa (1999). 11 It is enough to think the used state aid measures in the form or recapitalization and asset relief measures to European banks between Oct 2008 and Dec 2012 amounted to 591.9 billion or 4.6% of EU 2012 GDP, with the highest share belonging (in the order) to Ireland, the UK, and Germany (Source: European Commission State Aid Scoreboard, 2013). Including approved aids and guarantees, this figure jumps to over 12% of the EU GDP for the period 2008-12 only. 
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both the internal and external equilibrium, with some EU non-euro area member 
states such as Poland, Denmark, and Sweden, but also other ‘pre-ins’, feeling 
they will lose grip in shaping euro zone policies (Oliver, 2016), especially 
against an enhanced role of Germany and the other euro area member states. 
This may trigger further skepticism, should the EMU fail to provide an 
attractive alternative model for integration. Deeper integration should carry on 
to the point of making euro-outs use their option to opt-in; something which is 
indeed not excluded by phase 3 of the Presidents Report. Any suboptimal 
solutions may be costly for the future of Europe’s integration path.   
There is no definitive study on the consequences of the impact of EU 
membership on the UK (see Fig 7). Hence, in terms of the UK withdrawal, much 
will depend on how successful the current Prime Minister, T. May, will be in 
framing the outcome of the renegotiation. In this respect, there is evidence 
suggesting that May’s job will not be the easiest one. Indeed, as Goodwin and 
Milazzo (2015) points out, when voters were last asked about the future of 
Britain’s relationship with the EU (in 2014), using a question moving away 
from the usual binary ‘remain-or-leave’ scenario, a majority (40%) were willing 
to remain within a reformed EU with reduced powers. 12  This is all not 
surprising, but it suggests PM May may have a hard time to renegotiate an 
agreement keeping the UK strong, with the right of entry to many of the EU 
benefits. Something the EU certainly cannot afford. 
While it is difficult to quantify now whether or not the UK would flourish 
outside the EU, it is safe to play an exercise in reverse. Withdrawal is likely to 
have an impact, particularly on some sectors, like farming (currently receiving 
                                                 
 12 This was followed by leave (25%) and people supporting a scenario with the EU staying the same (18%). The popularity of an enhanced EU or even its evolution to a single government including the UK was the lowest (Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 1993–2014). 
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subsidiaries through the CAP), investment, education, and finance. In terms of 
budget, for instance, while the UK pays more into the EU budget than it 
receives from it (-0.46%), the net balance is not different from that of the Nordic 
EU non-euro area countries such as Denmark (-0.49%) and Sweden (-0.51%). 
Other countries having a negative balance are: Luxemburg and Italy (about 
0.20%), Finland (~ 0.30%), Austria, France, Belgium (~ 0.40%), the Netherlands 
(-0.45%) and Germany (-0.49%) (Source: European Commission’s “Financial 
Programming and Budget: UK”).13 Although the UK is a net contributor to the 
EU, certain regions receive significant support from the budget through the 
European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. These 
receipts from the EU budget, for the latest year for which data behind the 
calculations are available, show that Wales – with a large agricultural sector – 
received as much as £163 per head. England received just £52 (Source: HM 
Consolidated statement on the use of EH fund in the UK). Such a variance in 
public sector receipts means that some parts of the UK (Wales and Northern 
Ireland) are net recipients from the EU budget while others (England and, to a 
lesser extent, Scotland) are net contributors. However, the net balance does not 
reflect the many benefits of EU membership, many of which are difficult to 
quantify, such as stability, security, freedom of working, living, studying and 
traveling within the EU. The UK government estimates that the single market 
brings in between GBP 31 billion and GBP 92 billion a year into the UK 
economy, equal to a contribution 5 to 15 times larger than the net UK 
contribution to the EU budget (Source: European Commission). The UK is also 
one of the top recipients of EU research funding. The UK Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) reports that the UK’s contribution to EU research and 
development of €5.4 billion over the period 2007–2013. The UK received €8.8 
                                                 
 13 European Commission’s website “financial Programming and Budget: UK” http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mycountry/UK/index_en.cfm  
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billion in direct EU funding for research, development and innovation 
activities during the same period (see also the Royal Society, 2016). 
Finally, on the issue of finance, the current approach to a European banking 
union (see Macchiarelli, 2016) lets foresee that the problem of funding of 
financial institutions will be accentuated with the UK withdrawal, having a 
strong impact on the extent cross-border externalities of bank failures across 
the EU will be addressed, particularly when they will involve guarantees to or 
resolution of banks which are systemic in both the euro area and the UK. While, 
going ahead, some of the other ‘outs’ may make use of their option to buy-in 
(see also Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014), provided that European resolution and 
deposit insurance schemes will be available, the UK’s move to stay out will 
leave the UK and the EU in unchartered waters, given the large presence of 
important European banks in London. This may change going ahead. 
Figure 7.  
Estimates of costs and benefits of UK’s membership of the EU 
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6. Conclusion 
To conclude, despite the risks that a multi-layer crisis poses to the very 
existence of the EU, the assumption that this could lead to less integration does 
not seem obvious by looking at the history of European economic and 
monetary integration. Being today some of the most crucial elements of 
integration at risk – the single market and people’s ability to move freely, and 
the single currency itself – Europe should use awareness of its existing limits 
to initiate a process of reform and, hopefully, deepening. This is the spirit of 
the 5 Presidents Report. The justification of such a process of “completing” the 
EMU can be rationalized both under economic and political terms, being the 
only root to a renewed European credibility. It remains to be asked – now that 
the British claims as a part of the package to stay in the EU have been discarded 
by the exit vote – whether the space for European integration may even be 
larger (see also De Grauwe, 2016b). This will all depend on how “low profile” 
the UK will accept to be in the future of Europe. 
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